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ABSTRACT
Deep packet inspection technology became a cornerstone of
Internet censorship by facilitating cheap and effective filter-
ing of what censors consider undesired information. More-
over, filtering is not limited to simple pattern matching but
makes use of sophisticated techniques such as active prob-
ing and protocol classification to block access to popular
circumvention tools such as Tor.
In this paper, we propose ScrambleSuit; a thin protocol
layer above TCP whose purpose is to obfuscate the trans-
ported application data. By using morphing techniques and
a secret exchanged out-of-band, we show that ScrambleSuit
can defend against active probing and other fingerprinting
techniques such as protocol classification and regular expres-
sions.
We finally demonstrate that our prototype exhibits little
overhead and enables effective and lightweight obfuscation
for application layer protocols.
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circumvention
1. INTRODUCTION
We consider deep packet inspection (DPI) harmful. While
originally meant to detect attack signatures in packet pay-
load, it is ineffective in practice due to the ease of evasion
[1, 2, 3]. At the same time, DPI technology is increasingly
used by censoring countries to filter the free flow of informa-
tion or violate network neutrality [4]. We argue that what
makes DPI particularly harmful is the asymmetry of block-
ing effectiveness, i.e., it is hard to stop motivated and skilled
network intruders but very easy to censor ordinary user’s
Internet access. DPI technology ultimately fails to protect
critical targets but succeeds in filtering the information flow
of entire countries.
Numerous well-documented cases illustrate how DPI tech-
nology is used by censoring countries. Amongst others,
China is using it to filter HTTP [5] and rewrite DNS re-
sponses [6]. Iran is known to use DPI technology to conduct
surveillance [7]. In Syria, DPI technology is used for the same
purpose [8]. Even more worrying, SSL interception proxies,
an increasingly common feature of DPI boxes, are used to
transparently decrypt and inspect SSL sessions which ef-
fectively breaks SSL’s confidentiality and given the rise of
opaque Internet traffic [9], there is no reason to believe that
this trend will decrease.
The rise of Internet censorship led to the creation of nu-
merous circumvention tools which engage in a rapidly de-
veloping arms race with the maintainers of censorship sys-
tems. Of particular interest to censoring countries is the
Tor network [10]. While originally designed as a low-latency
anonymity network, it turned out to be an effective tool to
circumvent censorship. The growing success of Tor as cir-
cumvention tool did not remain unnoticed, though. Tor is or
was documented to be blocked in many countries including
Iran [11], China [12] and Ethiopia [13], just to name a few.
We argue that many circumvention tools—Tor included—
suffer from two shortcomings which can easily be exploited
by a censor.
First and most importantly, they are vulnerable to active
probing as pioneered by the Great Firewall of China (GFW)
[12]: the GFW is able to block Tor by first identifying po-
tential Tor connections based on the TLS client cipher list.
If such a signature is found on the wire, the GFW recon-
nects to the suspected Tor bridge and tries to “speak” the
Tor protocol with it. If this succeeds, the GFW blacklists
the respective bridge. Active probing is not only used to dis-
cover Tor but—as we will discuss—also VPN [14] and obfs2
[15], which is a censorship-resistant protocol. From a cen-
sor’s point of view, active probing is a promising strategy
which greatly reduces collateral damage caused by inaccu-
rate signatures. Also, active probing is non-trivial to defend
against because censors can easily emulate real computer
users.
Figure 1:
ScrambleSuit’s
protocol stack.
Second, circumvention tools tend
to exhibit a certain“flow signature”
which typically remains static. An
example is Tor’s characteristic 586-
byte signature (cf. §5.1). If a cen-
sor is able to deploy high-accuracy
classifiers trained to recognise these
very flow signatures, the respective
protocol is blocked. Censorship-
resistant protocols are unable to
evade these filters by changing their
flow signature.
In this work, we present ScrambleSuit; a blocking-resistant
transport protocol which tackles the two above mentioned
problems. ScrambleSuit defines a thin protocol layer on top
of TCP which provides lightweight obfuscation for the trans-
ported application layer protocol. As shown in Figure 1,
ScrambleSuit is independent of its application layer protocol
and works with any application supporting SOCKS. As a
result, we envision ScrambleSuit to be used by, among other
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protocols, Tor and VPN to tackle the GFW’s most recent
censorship upgrades.
In particular, ScrambleSuit exhibits the following four fea-
tures:
Pseudo-random payload: To an observer, ScrambleSuit’s
entire traffic is computationally indistinguishable from
randomness. As a result, there are no predictable pat-
terns which would otherwise form suitable DPI finger-
prints. This renders regular expressions for the pur-
pose of identifying ScrambleSuit useless.
Polymorph: Despite the pseudo-random traffic, a censor
could still block our protocol based on flow character-
istics such as the packet length distribution. Scramble-
Suit is, however, able to change its shape to make it
harder for classifiers to exploit flow characteristics.
Shared secret: We defend against active probing by mak-
ing use of a secret which is shared between client and
server and exchanged out-of-band. The server only an-
swers to requests if knowledge of the secret is proven
by the client.
Usable: We seek to maximise ScrambleSuit’s usability. Our
protocol easily integrates in Tor’s existing ecosystem
and does not require architectural changes. Further-
more, the moderate protocol overhead, as shown in §5,
facilitates comfortable web surfing.
Blocking-resistant protocols can be split into two groups.
While the first group strives to mimic typically whitelisted
protocols such as HTTP [16] and Skype [17], the second
group aims to look like randomness [18, 19, 20]. Randomised
protocols have the shortcoming of not being able to survive
a whitelisting censor. Nevertheless, we decided in favour
of randomising because mimicing comes at the cost of high
overhead, is difficult to do correctly [21] and we consider
whitelisting on a nation scale—at least for most countries—
unlikely even though it is often done in corporate networks.
So, instead of maximising obfuscation while maintaining an
acceptable level of usability, we maximise usability while
keeping an acceptable level of obfuscation.
The contributions of this paper are as follows.
• We propose ScrambleSuit, a blocking-resistant trans-
port protocol.
• We propose two authentication mechanisms based on
shared secrets and polymorphism as a practical defence
against active probing and protocol classifiers.
• We implement and evaluate a fully functional proto-
type of our protocol.
We finally point out that unblockable network protocols
do not exist. After all, censors could always “pull the plug”
as it was already done in Egypt [22] and Syria [23]. By
proposing ScrambleSuit, we do not claim to end the arms
race in our favour but rather to raise the bar once again.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In
§2 we discuss related work which is then followed by an ar-
chitectural overview in §3. §4 then discusses ScrambleSuit’s
design in detail. The protocol is then evaluated in §5 and
the results discussed in §6. We finally conclude the paper in
§7.
2. RELATED WORK
2.1 Protocol Identification
The identification of protocols is typically motivated by
quality of service, traffic shaping and accounting – but also
censorship. In order to block protocols, they have to be
identified first. Many protocol identification techniques fail
in the face of protocols which make an active effort to re-
main undetected. This led to the research community find-
ing ways to, e.g., detect protocol tunneling in HTTP and
SSH [24], the Skype protocol [25] or encrypted traffic [26].
Of particular relevance is the work of Hjelmvik and John
[27]. The authors investigated to which extent supposedly
obfuscated protocols such as Skype, BitTorrent’s message
stream encryption and Spotify can be identified. Based on
their findings, Hjelmvik and John suggest evasion techniques
for protocol designers which should make it harder to iden-
tify obfuscated protocols. Some of our design decisions were
motivated by their suggestions. Similar to Hjelmvik and
John, Wiley proposed a framework to dynamically classify
network protocols based on Bayesian models [28]. This is
an important first step towards the ability to compare and
evaluate blocking-resistant transport protocols.
2.2 Protocol Obfuscation
The Tor project developed a blocking-resistant protocol
called obfs2 [18]. The protocol implements an obfuscation
layer on top of TCP and transports Tor traffic. A pas-
sive man-in-the-middle (MITM), however, can decrypt obfs2
traffic. The successor, obfs3 [19], uses a customised Diffie-
Hellman handshake to solve this problem. However, both,
obfs2 and obfs3 can be actively probed and do not disguise
flow properties. In fact, the GFW is already blocking obfs2
bridges by actively probing them [15]. Later in this paper,
we extend obfs3’s handshake to be resistant against active
probing.
Wiley’s Dust protocol [20] compares to obfs2 and obfs3 in
that Dust payload looks like random data. The key exchange
is handled out-of-band. Dust also employs packet padding
to camouflage packet lengths. However, unlike ScrambleSuit,
Dust does not consider inter arrival times.
Weinberg et al. presented StegoTorus [16], a framework
for obfuscation modules similar to obfsproxy which is de-
veloped by the Tor project [29]. StegoTorus can complicate
protocol identification on the application layer as well as
on the transport layer. Tor connections can be multiplexed
over multiple TCP connections and the application layer is
camouflaged by mimicing a cover protocol such as HTTP.
SkypeMorph, as presented by Moghaddam et al. [17]
compares to StegoTorus in that it disguises Tor traffic by
mimicing an existing protocol; in this particular case Skype
video traffic. As long as the censor does not decide to block
the cover protocols, SkypeMorph and StegoTorus are able
to survive a whitelisting censor. ScrambleSuit differs from
SkypeMorph and StegoTorus since it does not mimic a cover
protocol. In fact, Houmansadr et al. claim that protocol
mimicing—as opposed to tunneling—is a flawed approach
due to the immense difficulty of mimicing a protocol cor-
rectly [21]. The authors showed that SkypeMorph and Ste-
goTorus differ from their respective cover protocols in nu-
merous ways.
Many blocking-resistant tools blindly employ different ob-
fuscation strategies in the hope to stay under the radar.
Figure 2: ScrambleSuit is a module for obfsproxy
which provides a SOCKS interface for local applica-
tions. The traffic between two obfsproxy instances
is disguised by ScrambleSuit.
Dyer et al. suggest the opposite [30]. The authors propose
to actively learn the regular expressions used by DPI boxes.
This knowledge is then used to map cipher text to regular
expressions which are guaranteed to pass the filters. This
requires the regular expressions of DPI boxes to be known
which is typically difficult in practice.
Lincoln et al. proposed DEFIANCE [31]: an architecture
to protect Tor bridges from being probed and their respec-
tive descriptors1 from being harvested by crawlers. The
authors accomplish these goals by developing a novel ren-
dezvous protocol as well as a technique called address-change
signaling.
A solution to the problem of IP address blocking is pro-
vided by Fifield et al. [32]. Instead of relying on long-lived
static bridge IP addresses, the authors propose to use short-
lived proxies which are run by web users visiting special
cooperating web sites. A practical problem remains to be
solved, however: clients making use of these so-called flash
proxies must be able to accept incoming TCP connections.
This is not always possible with censored users behind NAT
boxes.
2.3 Undetectable Authentication
Vasserman et al. proposed an undetectable authentication
system based on port knocking [33]. Their system, Silent-
Knock, does however have operating system dependencies
and does not protect against connection hijacking.
Smits et al. adapted SilentKnock to better work with
Tor bridges [34]. The result is called BridgeSPA. When us-
ing BridgeSPA, clients can authenticate themselves towards
a bridge with just a TCP SYN segment. If the authenti-
cation does not succeed, the bridge does not respond with
a SYN/ACK segment and the bridge appears to be offline.
Just like SilentKnock, BridgeSPA does not protect against
connection hijacking and faces a number of practical prob-
lems such as the inability to cope with NAT and the depen-
dence on Linux kernels. While ScrambleSuit can not hide its
“aliveness”, it is not hindered by NAT or connection hijack-
ing.
3. ARCHITECTURAL OVERVIEW
ScrambleSuit is a module for obfsproxy which is an ob-
fuscation framework developed by the Tor project [29]. As
long as obfsproxy is running on the censored client as well as
on the server, network traffic in between both communica-
tion points can be obfuscated as dictated by the obfuscation
modules. As illustrated in Figure 2, obfsproxy acts as a
1A bridge descriptor is essentially a tuple containing the
bridge’s IP address, port and fingerprint.
Figure 3: Internally, ScrambleSuit handles authenti-
cated encryption of application data, client authen-
tication as well as flow reshaping using a packet mor-
pher and delayer.
proxy between the Tor client and the Tor bridge. While
specifically designed for Tor, obfsproxy can be used by any
application as long as it supports the SOCKS protocol.
Internally, ScrambleSuit is composed of several compo-
nents which are depicted in Figure 3. Outgoing network
data is first encrypted and then chopped into pieces (or
padded) by the packet morpher. Before these pieces are then
sent over the wire, the packet delayer uses small sleep calls
to disguise inter arrival times. Finally, incoming network
data is first reassembled to complete ScrambleSuit protocol
messages and after decryption finally passed on to the local
application.
We aim to conceal several aspects of Tor’s communication
characteristics. We chose these characteristics based on the
work by Hjelmvik and John [27, 35] as well as current DPI
capabilities.
Payload By encrypting all ScrambleSuit traffic, we elimi-
nate all payload fingerprints such as Tor’s TLS cipher
list [12].
Packet length distribution Among other things, we seek
to get rid of Tor’s characteristic 586-byte packets [16,
36]. We do so by morphing Tor’s packet length distri-
bution to a randomly chosen distribution.
Inter arrival times Similar to the packet length obfusca-
tion, we camouflage the inter arrival times by employ-
ing small and random sleep intervals before writing
data on the wire.
3.1 Threat Model
Our adversary is a nation-state censor who desires to
block unwanted network protocols and services which would
otherwise allow users within the censoring regime the re-
trieval of unfiltered information or to evade the national fil-
tering system. The censor is making use of payload analysis,
flow analysis as well as active probing to identify and then
block undesired protocols.
The censor further has full active and passive control over
the national network. The censor can passively monitor all
traffic entering and leaving its networks in line rate. We
further expect the censor to actively tamper with traffic;
namely to inject, drop and modify traffic as well as hijack
TCP sessions. We further expect the censor to select a sub-
set of suspicious traffic for further inspection on the slow
path2. This could involve active probing as done by the
2We define the slow path as the minute analysis of a small
GFW in order to block the Tor network [12]. We model
our censor to also conduct active MITM attacks. While we
believe that passive analysis and active probing are signif-
icantly easier to deploy, there is evidence that censors are
starting to—or at least have the ability to—conduct active
MITM attacks as well [37].
Our adversary is also training and deploying statistical
classifiers to identify and block protocols. While computa-
tionally expensive, it would be imaginable that a censor uses
this strategy at least on the slow path and perhaps even on
the fast path when using inexpensive flow features.
3.1.1 Adversary Limitations
We expect the censor to be subject to economical con-
straints. In particular, we assume that the censor is not us-
ing a whitelisting approach meaning that only well-defined
protocols pass the national filter. Whitelisting implies sig-
nificant over-blocking and we expect this approach to collide
with the censor’s economical incentives. We also expect the
censor to not block protocols when there is only weak ev-
idence for the protocol being blacklisted. This is a direct
consequence of avoiding over-blocking by minimising collat-
eral damage.
Finally, we assume that the censor does not have access to
or can otherwise influence censored users’ computers. Once
again, we believe that such a scenario is likely to occur in
corporate networks but not on a national scale.
4. PROTOCOL DESIGN
This section will discuss ScrambleSuit’s defence against ac-
tive probing, its encryption, encoding and header format as
well as how we achieve polymorphism.
4.1 Thwarting Active Probing
We defend against active probing by proposing two mu-
tual authentication mechanisms which rely on a secret which
is shared out-of-band. A ScrambleSuit connection can only
be established when both parties can prove knowledge of
this very secret. While our first authentication mechanism
(see §4.1.2) is designed to work well in Tor’s ecosystem, our
second mechanism (see §4.1.3) provides additional security
and efficiency if ScrambleSuit is used by other application
protocols such as VPN.
With respect to Tor, there already exists an out-of-band
communication channel which is used to distribute bridge
descriptors to censored users. Naturally, we make use of
this channel. If, however, ScrambleSuit is used to tunnel
protocols other than Tor, users have to handle out-of-band
communication themselves.
4.1.1 Proof-of-Work (Again) Proves Not to Work
Before deciding in favour of using a secret exchanged out-
of-band, we investigated the suitability of client puzzles.
Puzzles—a variant of proof-of-work schemes—could be used
by a server to time-lock a secret. This secret can then only
be unlocked by clients by spending a moderate amount of
computational resources on the problem. One particular
puzzle construction, namely time-lock puzzles as proposed
by Rivest et al. [38], provides appealing properties such
traffic subset as opposed to the fast path which covers the
majority of all network traffic and, as a result, has to be
processed quickly.
as deterministic unlocking time, asymmetric work load and
inherently sequential computation which means that adver-
saries in the possession of highly parallel architectures have
no significant advantage over a client with a single CPU.
While a single client puzzle can not be solved in paral-
lel, a censor is able to solve multiple puzzles in parallel by
assigning all puzzles to the available CPU cores. This is
problematic because our threat model includes censors with
powerful and parallel architectures. After estimating the Tor
bridge churn rate, we came to the conclusion that client puz-
zles would probably not be able to increase a well-equipped
censor’s work load beyond the point of becoming impracti-
cal ; at least not without becoming impractical for clients as
well. This balancing problem is analogous to why proof-of-
work schemes are believed to be unpractical for the spam
problem as well [39].
In summary, proof-of-work schemes would not require a
shared secret but we believe that this small usability im-
provement would come at the cost of greatly reduced cen-
sorship resistance. A censor in the possession of powerful
computational resources would certainly be slowed down but
could ultimately not be stopped. Active probing would sim-
ply become a matter of investing more resources.
4.1.2 Session Tickets
We now discuss the first of our two authentication mech-
anisms. A client can authenticate herself towards a Scram-
bleSuit server by redeeming a session ticket. A session ticket
needs to be obtained only once out-of-band. Subsequent
connections are then bootstrapped using tickets issued by
the server during the respective previous connection. A real
world analogy would be a person redeeming a ticket in order
to gain access to a football stadium. Upon entering the sta-
dium (i.e., successful authentication), the guards give the
person a new ticket so that she is able to return for the
next match. The same procedure then happens for the next
match.
Session tickets are standardised in RFC 5077 [40] and part
of TLS since version 1.0. We employ only a subset of the
standard since we do not need its full functionality.
The basic idea is illustrated in Figure 4. ScrambleSuit
servers issue new session tickets Tt+1 which contain a future
shared master key kt+1 and an issue date d indicating the
ticket’s creation time. Session tickets are encrypted and au-
thenticated with secret keys kS
3 only known to the server,
i.e., Tt+1 = EnckS (kt+1 || d). As a result, a ticket T is
opaque to the client. Note that a client, when obtaining a
ticket, also has to learn the master key kt+1 in order to be
able to derive the same session keys as the server; so clients
always obtain the tuple (kt+1 || Tt+1). Session tickets have
the advantage that the server does not have to keep track of
issued tickets. Instead, the server’s state is outsourced and
stored by clients which greatly reduces a server’s load.
Whenever a client successfully connects to a ScrambleSuit
server, the server issues a new ticket concatenated to the
according master key (kt+1 || Tt+1) for the client. The tu-
ple is placed in a special ScrambleSuit control message (see
§4.2). The new ticket is sent immediately after successful
bootstrapping.
We mentioned earlier that a ScrambleSuit server man-
3For simplicity, we refer to these two symmetric keys as just
kS while they are in fact two keys: one for encryption and
one for authentication.
Tt || P || MACkt(Tt || P || E)
Enckt(kt+1 || Tt+1)
Enckt(Data)
Client Server
Figure 4: The client redeems a valid session ticket Tt
containing the master key kt. The server responds
by issuing a new ticket Tt+1 for future use. Both
parties then exchange application data.
ages secret keys kS which are used to encrypt and authen-
ticate session tickets. This prevents clients from tampering
with tickets and the server can verify that a newly received
and authenticated ticket was, in fact, issued by the server.
Servers rotate their kS keys after a period of seven days. Af-
ter the generation of new kS keys, the superseded keys are
kept for another seven days in order to decrypt and verify
(but not to issue!) tickets which were issued by the su-
perseded keys. As a result, tickets are always valid and
redeemable for a period of exactly seven days; no matter
when they were issued. As a result, as long as a user keeps
reconnecting to a ScrambleSuit server at least once a week,
key continuity is ensured and there is no need for additional
out-of-band communication.
A censor could now conduct traffic analysis by looking for
TCP connections which always begin with the client sending
|T | bytes to the server. To obfuscate the ticket length, we
introduce random padding P and authenticate the ticket T
as well as the padding P by computing MACkt(T || P || E)
with kt being the shared master secret which the client ob-
tained together with the ticket and E discussed in the fol-
lowing paragraph. Both parties will use kt to derive session
keys as discussed in §4.2. The server knows that all bytes
of the handshake were successfully received when the last
bytes form a valid MAC over the previous bytes. The ex-
act amount of random padding is determined by the packet
morpher discussed in §4.3.1. We use HMAC-SHA256-128
for the MAC.
At this point, a censor could still intercept tickets and re-
play them. This would make the server issue a new ticket
for the censor. While the censor would not be able to read
the resulting ScrambleSuit control message—the shared mas-
ter key kt would be unknown—the fact that a replay attack
triggers a response can be suspicious. We prevent replay at-
tacks, or in other words ticket double spending, by caching
master keys kt. If a server encounters a cached kt, it does not
reply to prevent the censor from learning the server’s state.
We begin to cache a kt after a new session ticket was issued
and the client acknowledged that she correctly received the
new ticket by using a special ScrambleSuit message type (see
§4.2). To reduce the amount of keys to cache, we add the
value E to the MAC. It refers to the Unix epoch divided by
3600, i.e., the current time with a granularity of one hour.
While this requires client and server to have loosely syn-
chronised clocks, the server has to cache redeemed keys for
a period of only one hour instead of seven days.
Session tickets already provide a strong level of protection.
Active probing and replay attacks are foiled while forward
Figure 5: ScrambleSuit bridges send their descrip-
tor to the bridge authority À. From there, it is dis-
tributed to censored users who learn about IP ad-
dress, port and the secret out-of-band Á. Finally,
direct connections can be established Â.
secrecy is provided. Therefore, we envision session tickets to
be satisfactory for most application protocols to be tunneled
over ScrambleSuit.
Session tickets do not, however, integrate well with Tor’s
existing ecosystem. The reason lies in how Tor bridges are
distributed to users. The process is illustrated in Figure
5. Volunteers will set up ScrambleSuit bridges which then
publish their descriptors—including IP address, port and
secret—to the bridge authority (1) which feeds this infor-
mation into the BridgeDB component. In the next step,
the gathered descriptors have to be distributed to censored
users (2). The two primary distribution channels are email
and HTTPS [41]. Users can ask for bridges over email or
they can visit the bridge distribution website4 and obtain
a set of bridges after solving a CAPTCHA. The problem
is that one bridge descriptor is typically shared by many
users. All these users would end up with an identical ses-
sion ticket. This causes two severe problems. First, our
replay protection mechanism does not allow reuse of session
tickets. Second, session ticket reuse would lead to identical
byte strings at the beginning of a ScrambleSuit handshake
which would be a strong distinguisher. These problems lead
us to our second authentication mechanism which is opti-
mised for Tor and can function with a secret which is shared
by many users as shown in the scenario in Figure 5.
4.1.3 Uniform Diffie-Hellman
Our second authentication mechanism is an extension of
the Uniform Diffie-Hellman (UniformDH) handshake which
was proposed in the obfs3 protocol specification [19, §3].
obfs3’s handshake makes use of uniformly distributed public
keys which are only negligibly different from random bytes.
As a result, UniformDH can be used to agree on a master
key kt without a censor knowing that Diffie-Hellman is used.
UniformDH is based on the 1536-bit modular exponential
group defined in RFC 3526 [42]. When initiating a Unifor-
mDH handshake, the client first generates a 1536-bit private
key x. The least significant bit of x is then unset in order
to make the number even. The public key X is defined as
X = gx (mod p) where g = 2. The server computes its pri-
vate key y and its public key Y the same way. To prevent a
censor from learning that X is a quadratic residue mod p—
a clear distinguisher—the client randomly chooses to send
either X or p−X to the server. The server can then derive
4URL: https://bridges.torproject.org.
X || P || MACkB (X || P || E)
Y || P || MACkB (Y || P || E)
Enckt(kt+1 || Tt+1)
Enckt(Data)
Client Server
Figure 6: After client and server agreed on the mas-
ter key kt using Diffie-Hellman, the server is issuing
a new session ticket for the client. Afterwards, both
parties exchange application data.
the shared master secret by calculating kt = X
y (mod p).
Since the private keys x and y are even, the exponentiations
Xy (mod p) and (p−X)y (mod p) result in the same shared
master secret.
4.1.4 Extending Uniform Diffie-Hellman
In its original form, the UniformDH construction does not
protect against active probing. A censor who suspects Uni-
formDH can simply probe the supposable bridge and oppor-
tunistically initiate a UniformDH handshake. To prevent
that attack, we now turn UniformDH’s anonymous hand-
shake into an authenticated handshake in order to be resis-
tant against active attacks.
We do so quite similar to the session tickets discussed in
§4.1.2. As depicted in Figure 6, we concatenate pseudo-
random padding P and a MAC to the public keys X and
Y . The MAC authenticates the respective public key as well
as the padding. The MAC is keyed by a shared secret kB
which is distributed together with the Tor bridge’s IP:port
tuple over email or HTTPS (cf. step À in Figure 5). As
with tickets, the server and client know that the handshake
message was fully received when the last received bytes form
a valid MAC over the previous bytes. Note that kB can be
reused because it is only used to key the MAC. The hand-
shake is conducted using UniformDH with randomly chosen
public keys. As a result, two subsequent UniformDH hand-
shakes based on the same kB will appear to be different to
a censor. We defend against replay attacks by adding E,
the Unix epoch divided by 3600, to the MAC and cache the
MAC for a period of one hour.
A successful UniformDH key agreement is followed by the
server issuing a session ticket for the client. The client will
then redeem this ticket upon connecting to the server the
next time. Accordingly, we expect the UniformDH hand-
shake to be done only once, namely when a Tor client con-
nects to a bridge for the first time. From then one, session
tickets will be used to connect to the same bridge.
To a censor, the payload of both authentication schemes
is computationally indistinguishable from randomness. As
a result, a censor who is assuming that a server is running
ScrambleSuit is unable to tell whether a client successfully
authenticated herself by using UniformDH or by redeeming
a session ticket.
We finally stress that bootstrapping ScrambleSuit using
UniformDH provides less security than when bootstrapped
using session tickets. Since the secret key kB for UniformDH
will be used by multiple clients, a malicious client in the pos-
Figure 7: ScrambleSuit’s message header format.
The encrypted part is authenticated by a HMAC-
SHA256-128. The entire message is computationally
indistinguishable from randomness.
session of kB and who is able to eavesdrop on the connection
of another client using the same ScrambleSuit server can con-
duct active MITM attacks. While Tor does protect against
active MITM attacks, this can be problematic for applica-
tion protocols other than Tor. Therefore, we emphasise that
session tickets are the preferred authentication mechanism
whereas our UniformDH extension’s sole purpose is to make
ScrambleSuit work well in Tor’s infrastructure.
4.1.5 Usability Considerations
In order for a user to successfully connect to a Scramble-
Suit server, she needs a triple: an IP address, a TCP port
and a secret which is either the UniformDH secret kB or a
session ticket tuple (kt || Tt). We expect these triples to be
distributed mostly electronically; over email, instant mes-
saging programs or online social networks. As a result, a
user can simply copy and paste the entire triple into her
obfsproxy configuration file.
We do, however, also expect limited verbal distribution of
ScrambleSuit triples, e.g., over a telephone line. To facilitate
this, we define the encoding format of secrets and tickets to
be Base32. Base32 strings consist of the letters A–Z, the
numbers 2–75 as well as the padding character “=”. Since
there is no distinction between uppercase and lowercase let-
ters, we hope to make verbal distribution less confusing
and error-prone. After all, a ScrambleSuit bridge descriptor
would look like: Bridge scramblesuit 1.2.3.4:443 pass-
word=NCA6I6GZZD42BWUB. We believe that the prefix pass-
word= will find more acceptance among users than simply
appending the secret.
4.2 Header Format and Confidentiality
Our protocol employs a custom message format whose
header is illustrated in Figure 7. ScrambleSuit exchanges
variable-sized messages with optional padding which is dis-
carded by the remote machine.
The first 16 bytes of the header are reserved for a HMAC-
SHA256-128 which protects the integrity and authenticity of
the protocol message. In accordance with the encrypt-then-
MAC paradigm, the HMAC is computed over the encrypted
remainder of the message. The secret key required by the
HMAC is derived from the shared master key.
The HMAC is followed by two bytes which specify the
total length of the protocol message. ScrambleSuit’s max-
imum transmission unit is 1460-byte-sized messages. To-
gether with a minimal IP and TCP header, this adds up to
1500-byte packets which fill an Ethernet frame. In order to
be able to distinguish padding from payload, the next two
bytes determine the payload length. If no padding is used,
the payload length equals the total length.
5The numbers 0 and 1 are omitted to prevent confusion with
the letters I and O.
To separate application data from protocol signaling, we
define a 1-byte message flag field. The first bit signals ap-
plication data in the message body whereas a message with
the second bit set contains a newly issued session ticket.
The third bit (which can be set together with the first bit)
confirms the receiving of a session ticket. We reserve the
remaining bits for future use. In particular, they could be
used to negotiate flow properties as discussed in §4.3.
The header is then followed by the message payload which
contains the application protocol transported by Scramble-
Suit. We employ encryption in order to hide the applica-
tion protocol, the padding as well as ScrambleSuit’s header.
With regard to Tor, this means that the already encrypted
Tor traffic is wrapped inside yet another layer of encryption.
For encryption, we use 256-bit AES in counter mode. The
counter mode effectively turns AES into a stream cipher.
We use two symmetric keys: one for the traffic C → S and
one for S → C. Both symmetric keys as well as the respec-
tive nonces for the counter mode are derived from the shared
master secret using HKDF based on SHA256 [43].
4.3 Changing Shape
So far, we discussed defences against censors who analyse
packet payload or conduct active attacks to reveal Scram-
bleSuit’s presence. However, a censor could also make use of
traffic analysis. In this section, we propose lightweight coun-
termeasures to diminish—but not to defeat!—such attacks.
In particular, we will teach ScrambleSuit how to change its
“protocol shape”6.
Our definition of ScrambleSuit’s shape is twofold: we con-
sider packet lengths and inter arrival times. While our trans-
ported data is encrypted and exhibits no structure, these
flow metrics can still leak information about the application
protocol [44, 45, 46]. As a result, we seek to randomise these
characteristics in order to decrease the accuracy of protocol
classifiers used to detect ScrambleSuit.
In general, the kernel’s TCP stack is responsible for packet
lengths. In order to affect packet lengths in user space, we
deactivate Nagle’s algorithm which seeks to avoid unneces-
sarily small TCP segments. This comes, however, at the
cost of increased protocol overhead.
The randomisation of packet lengths as well as inter ar-
rival times is based on a randomly generated discrete prob-
ability distribution. We generate these distributions by first
determining the amount of bins n which is uniformly chosen
from the set {1..100}. In the next step, we assign each bin
bi for 1 ≤ i ≤ n a probability by randomly picking a value
in the interval ]0, 1 −∑ni=1 bi−1[ for b0 = 0. The following
gives an example of four assignments.
b0 ← 0 (1)
b1
R← ]0, 1− b0[ (2)
b2
R← ]0, 1− b0 − b1[ (3)
bn
R← ]0, 1− b0 − ...− bn−1[ (4)
We will show in §5 that this naive approach turns out
to be sufficient to obfuscate Tor’s flow characteristics. A
specialised algorithm—e.g., to optimise throughput—would
be conceivable but is beyond the scope of this paper.
6This happens analogous to the scramble suits in Philip K.
Dick’s novel “A Scanner Darkly”.
4.3.1 Packet Length Adaption
It is well known that a network flow’s packet length dis-
tribution leaks information about the network protocol [27,
44, 47] and even the content [48, 46]. For instance, a large
fraction of Tor’s traffic contains 568-byte packets which is
the result of Tor’s internal use of 512-byte cells plus TLS’
header (see Figure 9 and 10). These 568-byte packets form
a strong distinguisher which can be used to detect Tor by
simply capturing a few dozen network packets as shown by
Weinberg et al. [16]. To defend against such simple appli-
cations of traffic analysis, we modify ScrambleSuit’s packet
length distribution.
An efficient way to morph a source distribution to a tar-
get distribution was proposed by Wright, Coull and Monrose
[49]. Their concept, traffic morphing, relies on the computa-
tion of a morphing matrix to minimise the overhead when
morphing a source distribution to a target distribution. Un-
fortunately, we cannot make use of traffic morphing because
our target distribution is dynamic which would require fre-
quent recomputation of the morphing matrix which is an
expensive operation. This would lead to unnecessary CPU
load on the client as well as on the bridge. Furthermore, our
source distribution is not known since ScrambleSuit is de-
signed to be able to handle arbitrary application protocols.
Instead, we adopt naive sampling to disguise the appli-
cation protocol’s packet length distribution. Every time
ScrambleSuit establishes a connection to a server, it ran-
domly generates a fresh discrete probability distribution as
discussed earlier. Every bin in the probability distribution is
uniformly chosen from the set {1..1460}. The newly gener-
ated distribution is then randomly sampled for every chunk
of application data, ScrambleSuit is about to send over the
wire. After a sample length is obtained, our algorithm ei-
ther a) pads the current packet to fit the sample’s length
or b) splits and sends it and then proceeds to morph the
remaining data the same way.
4.3.2 Inter Arrival Time Adaption
Analogous to the packet length distribution, the distribu-
tion of inter arrival times between consecutive packets has
discriminative power and could be used by censors to iden-
tify protocols [50]. In contrast to the packet length distribu-
tion, inter arrival times are frequently distorted by network
jitter, overloaded middle boxes and the communicating end
points. Nevertheless, we believe that it would be no sound
strategy to assume the network to be unreliable enough to
render measurements useless. Therefore, ScrambleSuit is also
able to modify its inter arrival times. The mechanism is the
same as for the packet length adaption: a random distribu-
tion is generated and then random samples are drawn from
it. The samples are the parameters for short sleep() calls
which are invoked prior to sending data to the remote end.
We are only able to increase inter arrival times but not to
decrease them. Increased inter arrival times have a direct
negative effect on throughput and can easily turn into a nui-
sance for users when getting too high. As a result, we keep
the sleep intervals within the interval of [0, 100[ milliseconds.
We believe that this interval represents a reasonable trade-
off between obfuscation and throughput as we will show in
§5.1.
4.3.3 Shortcomings
It is important to note that for a censor armed with a
well-chosen set of features, traffic analysis can be a powerful
attack and strong defences are believed to be expensive [45,
46]. We made an effort to disguise obvious flow features while
keeping throughput high enough to facilitate comfortable
web surfing and enable the transportation of low-latency
applications over ScrambleSuit.
A censor can still measure derived flow metrics such as
“total bytes transferred”, packet directions or the “bursti-
ness” of ScrambleSuit’s behaviour. These metrics would be
expensive to disguise and by exploiting them, a censor would
at least be able to guess whether ScrambleSuit’s transported
application is a bulk file transfer or a request-response pro-
tocol. Nevertheless, traffic analysis does not give censors a
certain answer. False positives are always a problem and can
lead to overblocking. As mentioned in our threat model, we
believe that the censor might use traffic analysis to select a
subset of traffic for closer inspection but not to block flows.
5. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
We implemented a prototype of ScrambleSuit in the form
of several Python modules for obfsproxy. Our prototype con-
sists of approximately 2000 lines of code. The measurements
below were all conducted using this prototype.
As illustrated in Figure 8, our experimental setup con-
sisted of two Debian GNU/Linux machines which were con-
nected via a router which performed the measurements. All
three machines were connected over Fast Ethernet. We ex-
pect this setup to be ideal for a censor because it does not
cause IP fragmentation or high latency due to overloaded
middle boxes. As a result, we believe that a censor would
do worse in practice. Both of our machines were running
Tor v0.2.4.10-alpha and obfsproxy. The Tor bridge was con-
figured to be private and was only used by our client. The
bridge then relayed all traffic into the public Tor network.
Note that ScrambleSuit is only“spoken” in between the client
and the bridge.
Figure 8: The experimental setup.
5.1 Blocking Resistance
To create network traffic for our measurements, we down-
loaded the 1 MB Linux kernel v1.0 from kernel.org7 on the
client. We downloaded the file once over Tor8 and 5 times
over ScrambleSuit.
7https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v1.0/linux-1.0.tar.
bz2.
8In fact, we downloaded the file many times over Tor and
found that consecutive runs differed mostly in the ratio be-
tween 586-byte and 1448-byte packets. As a result, we only
plot one run.
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Figure 9: Client-to-server packet lengths.
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Figure 10: Server-to-client packet lengths.
The packet length distribution for client-to-server traffic is
illustrated in Figure 9 and the server-to-client traffic in Fig-
ure 10. The solid orange line represents the download over
Tor. The prevalence of 586-byte packets is clearly visible;
especially for the client-to-server traffic. These packets con-
tain internal Tor cells which handle flow control. All these
segments had to be wrapped into a 512-byte Tor cell. In ad-
dition, more than 50% of the server-to-client traffic consists
of 1448-byte packets. The remaining brown lines represent
5 consecutive downloads over ScrambleSuit. Both empirical
cumulative distribution functions visibly deviate from Tor’s.
Figure 11 and 12 depict the inter arrival times of the same
data. The delays in Figure 11 tend to be rather high—only
40% of Tor packets had an inter arrival delay under 10 ms—
because the client only acknowledged the bulk data coming
from the server. For this reason, the delays are much smaller
in Figure 12. For both, the packet lengths as well as the
inter arrival times, a two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test
rejected the hypothesis that the Tor distributions equal any
of ScrambleSuit’s distributions.
5.2 Performance
In order to evaluate ScrambleSuit’s overhead and goodput,
we created a 1,000,000-byte file consisting of random bytes
and placed it on a web server operated by our institution.
We then downloaded the file with wget 25 times over HTTP,
Tor and ScrambleSuit, respectively. For Tor and Scramble-
Table 1: Mean (µ) and standard deviation (σ) of the goodput, transferred KBytes and the total overhead.
The data was generated based on the download of a 1,000,000-byte file.
HTTP Tor ScrambleSuit
µ σ µ σ µ σ
Goodput 6.3 MB/s 3.4 MB/s 279.7 KB/s 293.9 KB/s 89.8 KB/s 41.1 KB/s
C→S KBytes 23.1 1.6 71.9 7.7 132.5 35.5
S→C KBytes 1047 20.7 1121.6 38.8 1242.3 70.2
Total overhead 9.5% 2.2% 22.2% 4.4% 40.7% 10.1%
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Figure 11: Client-to-server inter arrival times.
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Figure 12: Server-to-client inter arrival times.
Suit, we established a new circuit for every download but
we used the same entry guard in order to make the results
more comparable. Based on the measured data, we calcu-
lated the mean µ and the standard deviation σ for several
performance metrics. The results are depicted in Table 1.
The goodput refers to the application layer throughput.
We achieved very high values for the HTTP download be-
cause the file transfer could be carried out over the LAN. Tor
averaged at roughly 280 KB/s and ScrambleSuit achieved
approximately one third of that. Just like Tor, Scramble-
Suit exhibits a high standard deviation. We believe that
this was mostly caused by differences in circuit throughput
but ScrambleSuit also fluctuates due to its different shapes.
Shapes featuring many large packet lengths lead to higher
throughput whereas shapes with small packets tend to harm
throughput.
The next two rows of Table 1 refer to the transferred
KBytes from client to server (C→S) and server to client
(S→C). Note that this covers all the data which was present
on the wire; including IP and TCP header. The consider-
ation of IP and TCP overhead is important because one of
the reasons for ScrambleSuit’s overhead is the varying packet
lengths which imply an increase in IP and TCP headers. Un-
surprising, Tor transferred more data than HTTP because of
Tor’s and TLS’ protocol overhead. ScrambleSuit transferred
the most data because of the additional protocol header (see
§4.2) as well as the varying packet lengths. This is empha-
sised by the high standard deviation of 35 and 70 KBytes,
respectively.
The last row illustrates the total protocol overhead. Once
again, we also consider IP and TCP headers. HTTP has the
lowest overhead followed by Tor and finally ScrambleSuit.
Our protocol exhibits 40% overhead with a high standard
deviation of 10% which stems from the shape shifts.
6. DISCUSSION
We made an effort to design ScrambleSuit in a way to be
resistant against current censorship threats; most notably
active probing. In this section we discuss the remaining
attack surface and point out emerging problems.
6.1 Attacks on ScrambleSuit
Active Probing: A censor could still actively probe a
ScrambleSuit server. Upon establishing a TCP connection,
a censor could proceed by sending arbitrary data. However,
the server will not respond without prior authentication. In
contrast to SilentKnock [33] and BridgeSPA [34], Scramble-
Suit does not disguise its “aliveness”. While this approach
does leak information9, it has the benefit of making Scram-
bleSuit significantly easier to deploy due to lack of platform
dependencies.
Packet Injection, Modification and Dropping: A
censor could tamper with an existing ScrambleSuit connec-
tion by injecting data, modifying bytes on the wire or drop-
ping packets. Both communicating parties will detect in-
jected or modified data due to the MAC being invalid. Hi-
jacking a ScrambleSuit TCP connection boils down to the
same problem; a censor would bypass the authentication
but is unable to talk to the ScrambleSuit server because the
session keys are unknown. Finally, dropped packets are han-
dled by the application protocol and could trigger TCP re-
transmissions.
9A censor learns that a server is online but unwilling to talk
unless given the “correct” data.
Payload & Flow Analysis: Payload analysis would only
yield data which is computationally indistinguishable from
randomness. Flow analysis, on the other hand, would yield a
certain distribution of packet lengths and inter arrival times
which changes from connection to connection. While §4.3.3
showed that defending against traffic analysis can be costly,
our main objective is to thwart active probing attacks be-
cause they enable deterministic protocol identification. So-
phisticated traffic analysis attacks will always have a range
of uncertainty. We believe that the GFW’s very reason to
conduct active probing is to obtain certainty and avoid col-
lateral damage. Protocol blocking based on traffic analysis
will unavoidably imply false positives.
6.2 Future Work
Improving Tor’s censorship resistance is a two-sided prob-
lem. On the one hand, bridge descriptors need to be dis-
tributed to users while not falling into the hands of cen-
sors and on the other hand, the subsequent Tor connection
should be hard to identify for censors. While we focused on
the latter, the former remains an open problem as well. Re-
cent work focused on reputation-based models to maximise
bridge aliveness [51, 52].
The arms race with circumvention tools might pressure
censors into introducing whitelisting. While we are not
aware of country-wide whitelists, Russia is experimenting
with a “Clean Internet” [53]. Should this approach turn out
to be successful for censors, the arms race will shift towards
tunneling circumvention traffic through whitelisted proto-
cols.
We finally point out that no protocol is “fingerprintless”.
In our design, we tried to avoid obvious distinguishers and
minimised the interaction surface for attackers who lack the
shared secret. But since ScrambleSuit does not mimic a cover
protocol, it hides within the set of unknown rather than
known protocols. As long as a censor’s network features
a high diversity of network protocols, the censor is unable
to fully control or model, we expect our approach to provide
a decent level of protection.
7. CONCLUSION
We presented ScrambleSuit; a transport protocol which
provides lightweight obfuscation for application protocols
such as Tor and VPN. The two major contributions of our
protocol are the ability to defend against active probing and
protocol classifiers. We achieve the former by proposing
two authentication mechanisms—one general-purpose and
the other specifically for Tor—and the latter by proposing
morphing techniques to disguise packet lengths and inter
arrival times.
We further developed a prototype of ScrambleSuit and
used it to conduct an experimental evaluation. In particular,
we discussed the effectiveness of our obfuscation techniques
as well as ScrambleSuit’s overhead. Our evaluation suggests
that ScrambleSuit can provide strong protection against cen-
sors who do not overblock significantly. Finally, we believe
that the low protocol overhead makes ScrambleSuit comfort-
able to use for web surfing and other low-latency applica-
tions.
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